13.05. 2026
Gernot Fritz
In April 2026, space lawyers and diplomats met again in Vienna for the 65th session of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS. The setting was familiar: international law, treaty principles and the long-standing question of how to ensure the peaceful and responsible use of outer space. The 65th session took place from 15 to 22 April 2026 and again addressed central issues of contemporary space governance, including the implementation of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), space resources, sustainability and space traffic management.
The economic and technological backdrop, however, has changed dramatically. Only a few months earlier, SpaceX had filed an application in the United States for a new non-geostationary satellite system of up to one million satellites, described as an “Orbital Data Center”. Other companies are exploring similar concepts, from orbital AI infrastructure to very large constellations designed to process data directly in space.
This contrast captures one of the central challenges of modern space law. International space law was not blind to private activity. The Outer Space Treaty expressly anticipated that non-governmental entities could carry out activities in outer space. What it could not fully anticipate was the scale, density and commercial complexity of today’s private space economy.
As space activities move from state-led exploration to privately operated infrastructure, one question becomes increasingly important: when companies go to space, which state is responsible?
The answer starts with the concept of the launching State. It is one of the key mechanisms through which international space law allocates responsibility and liability to states, even where the underlying activity is carried out by private operators.
The launching State: responsibility through launch
The concept of the launching State is one of the central connecting factors of international space law. It appears already in the Outer Space Treaty and is further developed in the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention). Its function is straightforward, but powerful: it connects a space object to one or more states and thereby creates a legal basis for international liability, registration and responsibility.
Under the Liability Convention, a launching State is not only the state that physically launches a space object. The definition is deliberately broader. It also includes a state that procures the launch, as well as a state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched. This means that a single mission may have several launching States at the same time. A satellite may be owned by a company in one country, launched by a provider incorporated in another country, and placed into orbit from a launch site located in yet another jurisdiction. International space law is designed to capture this complexity by attaching responsibility to several possible state links.
The legal consequence is particularly important in the context of liability. Under the Liability Convention, launching States are internationally liable for damage caused by their space objects. For damage on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight, liability is absolute. For damage caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth, in particular in outer space, liability depends on fault (for details see our previous post). The basic structure is therefore state-centred: if damage occurs, the international claim is directed against a state, even if the activity that caused the damage was conducted by a private operator.
This does not mean that the private operator is economically irrelevant. In practice, national licensing regimes, insurance requirements and contractual indemnities are used to shift financial exposure back to the operator. But the international legal architecture remains clear: at the level of public international law, the responsible actor is the state. The company may operate the satellite, manage the constellation or provide the service, but the launching State remains a key legal anchor.
This is particularly relevant for large-scale constellations and new forms of orbital infrastructure. The more objects are placed in orbit, the more important the allocation of responsibility becomes. Collision risks, debris mitigation, re-entry, frequency coordination and end-of-life disposal are not merely technical issues. They are also legal issues because they determine whether a state can credibly fulfil its obligations under international space law and manage the risks attached to the space objects for which it may be internationally responsible.
The limits of the launching State concept
The launching State concept is essential, but it does not answer every question. It is primarily linked to the launch of a space object and to the consequences that follow from that launch. It does not, by itself, fully regulate the ongoing conduct of private actors in outer space. This matters because modern space activities are no longer limited to the act of launch. The economically relevant activity often begins only after the satellite has reached orbit.
A communications satellite may operate for years. An Earth observation satellite may generate and transmit data continuously. A constellation may be expanded, reconfigured or partially replaced over time. Future orbital data centres may process data in space, interact with ground-based infrastructure and rely on complex operational chains involving several companies and jurisdictions. In these scenarios, the question is not only who launched the object, but who authorises and supervises the continuing activity.
This becomes even more visible where ownership or operational control changes after launch. A satellite may be sold from one company to another. Control may be transferred to an operator in another jurisdiction. A mission may be restructured after financing, insolvency or a corporate acquisition. The original launching State may remain a launching State for purposes of liability, but the state best placed to supervise the ongoing activity may be another state. International space law therefore needs another concept to address private activities as activities, not merely as launched objects.
That concept is the “appropriate State” under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
Article VI OST: private activities under public responsibility
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty is one of the most important provisions for the commercial space economy. It provides that states bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether those activities are carried out by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities. It then adds the decisive rule: the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate State.
This provision shows that private space activities were not forgotten by the treaty system. On the contrary, they were expressly addressed. The drafters of the Outer Space Treaty did not assume that only governments would act in space forever. They created a mechanism through which private activity could be integrated into a public international law framework. The mechanism is indirect regulation: international law does not generally license companies directly, but it obliges states to authorise and supervise them.
The practical importance of Article VI is difficult to overstate. It means that a company cannot simply conduct space activities outside the reach of public responsibility. Even where the operator is private, the activity remains internationally attributable to a state in the sense that the state bears responsibility for ensuring that the activity complies with international law. Private space activity is therefore not a legal vacuum. It is activity conducted under a framework of state responsibility.
At the same time, Article VI leaves open one of the most important operational questions: which state is the “appropriate State”? The treaty does not define the term. Depending on the circumstances, several connecting factors may be relevant. These may include the nationality or place of incorporation of the operator, the place from which the activity is conducted, the state that licensed the mission, the state that exercises effective regulatory control, or the state that is otherwise closely connected to the activity.
This open-textured approach gives the system flexibility, but it also creates uncertainty. In simple cases, the answer may be obvious. In complex cross-border missions, it may not. A satellite may be operated by a company incorporated in State A, controlled through infrastructure in State B, launched from State C, and used to provide services to customers worldwide. Several states may have a legitimate regulatory interest. Several states may also have a legal reason to ensure that the activity is properly authorised and supervised.
Why national space laws are necessary
Article VI leads to a very practical consequence: states that want to enable private space activities need national space laws. The obligation to authorise and continuously supervise private actors cannot be fulfilled by general policy statements alone. It requires procedures, competent authorities, substantive licensing criteria, monitoring powers, enforcement tools and, in many cases, insurance and indemnity requirements.
National space legislation is therefore not merely an expression of industrial policy. It is the domestic implementation layer of international responsibility. States adopt licensing regimes because they need to control the activities for which they may be internationally responsible. They need to know who is operating, what is being launched, how the mission will be conducted, what risk mitigation measures are in place, how debris will be avoided, and what happens at the end of the mission.
This can be seen clearly in several national regimes. France’s Space Operations Act was adopted to implement France’s obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention. It establishes a framework for the authorisation and supervision of space operations under French responsibility, including launches, in-orbit control and re-entry operations. The French framework is often cited as one of the more technically detailed national regimes, reflecting France’s particular role in European launch activities and its connection to the Guiana Space Centre.
The United Kingdom has also developed a detailed licensing framework. Under the Space Industry Act 2018 and related guidance, operators may require licences for launch activities, spaceports, range control and orbital operations. UK guidance makes clear that an orbital operator licence may cover the operation of a space object in orbit and other activity in outer space, and that licensing is not limited to activities in Earth orbit. The regime therefore reflects the same basic Article VI logic: private activities must be brought within an authorisation and supervision framework.
The United States follows a more functionally divided model. Launch and re-entry activities are regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration, remote sensing is regulated through NOAA, and communications satellites are regulated through the Federal Communications Commission. This structure has supported a large commercial space sector, but it has also generated debate about so-called “novel space activities” that do not fit neatly into existing regulatory categories. That debate is highly relevant from an Article VI perspective because the international obligation to authorise and supervise does not disappear simply because an activity falls between domestic regulatory silos.
Luxembourg provides another example. It has positioned itself as a jurisdiction for commercial space activities, including space resources. Its national framework combines authorisation requirements with a policy choice to support commercial space resource activities. The broader point is not that all national regimes are identical. They are not. The point is that they all respond to the same structural requirement: private space activity must be connected to a state-based system of authorisation and continuing supervision.
The EU Space Act as the next layer
In Europe, this discussion is increasingly moving beyond individual national regimes. The proposed EU Space Act is part of a broader effort to create a more coherent European framework for space activities, with a focus on safety, resilience and sustainability. While space law has traditionally been shaped by national authorisation systems, the growing importance of satellites for communications, navigation, Earth observation, security and digital infrastructure creates pressure for more harmonised rules.
This development fits directly into the logic of Article VI. If private actors operate across borders, fragmented national regimes may create gaps, overlaps or inconsistent requirements. A European framework could help align expectations for operators and regulators, particularly in areas such as space traffic management, cybersecurity, debris mitigation and operational resilience. At the same time, any EU-level approach needs to interact carefully with existing national authorisation systems and with the international responsibility of individual states under the Outer Space Treaty.
For companies, the practical point is that the regulatory landscape is likely to become more dense, not less. Space activities are moving closer to other areas of regulated technology infrastructure. Satellite networks are no longer only space assets; they are also communications infrastructure, data infrastructure, security infrastructure and, potentially, AI infrastructure. That convergence makes the authorisation question more complex because several regulatory regimes may apply at the same time.
Practical problems: transfers, control and continuing supervision
The requirement of continuing supervision is easy to state, but difficult to implement. It is not enough for a state to authorise a mission at the beginning and then disappear from the picture. Article VI requires ongoing oversight. This raises practical questions over the entire lifecycle of a space activity.
One example is the transfer of satellites or satellite operations. If a satellite operated by a company in State A is sold to a company in State B, the launching State may remain unchanged, but the state exercising effective regulatory control over the operator may change. The key legal question is how supervision continues without interruption. Does the original licence permit such a transfer? Is prior approval required? Does the new operator need a new licence in its own jurisdiction? How are insurance, indemnity and debris mitigation obligations transferred?
Similar questions arise in corporate transactions. If a company holding a space licence is acquired, the regulator may need to assess whether the new ownership structure affects control, security, technical capability or compliance. In a sector where assets may be operated remotely, financed internationally and integrated into global networks, corporate law and regulatory law become closely connected.
Another practical challenge concerns missions involving several operators. A constellation may include satellites owned by one entity, operated by another and integrated into services provided by a third. Ground stations, data processing, telemetry, tracking and control may be distributed across different jurisdictions. In such structures, identifying the entity that must hold the licence and the state that must supervise the activity becomes a central structuring question.
This is why space law increasingly resembles other areas of technology regulation. Formal ownership is not always the decisive factor. Operational control, technical capability, access to systems, decision-making authority and risk management may matter just as much. The legal analysis must therefore follow the actual architecture of the mission.
Responsibility as market infrastructure
For private actors, state responsibility may at first look like a constraint. In reality, it is also market infrastructure. Without authorisation, there is no lawful basis for many commercial space activities. Without supervision, states cannot credibly meet their international obligations. Without clear allocation of liability and risk, investors, customers and counterparties cannot properly assess the legal environment of a mission.
This is particularly relevant for new business models. Orbital data centres, in-orbit servicing, debris removal, commercial lunar payload delivery and space resource activities all raise questions that go beyond traditional launch licensing. They require regulators to understand novel technical systems and companies to understand that regulatory strategy is part of mission design.
The earlier these questions are addressed, the easier they are to manage. Choosing the jurisdiction of incorporation, the launch provider, the licensing route, the operational control model and the contractual risk allocation can significantly affect the regulatory profile of a mission. These decisions should not be treated as administrative details at the end of the project. They are part of the legal architecture of the activity.
Conclusion: private activity, public responsibility
The rise of private space activities does not mean that the international legal framework has become irrelevant. On the contrary, it makes the core principles of that framework more important. The Outer Space Treaty anticipated private actors and made clear that their activities require authorisation and continuing supervision. What has changed is the scale and complexity of the activities that must now be supervised.
The launching State remains a central concept for allocating liability and connecting space objects to states. Article VI and the concept of the appropriate State add the regulatory dimension: private actors may operate in space, but they do so under public responsibility. National space laws are the bridge between these two levels. They translate international obligations into licences, technical requirements, monitoring duties and enforcement powers.
As space activities evolve from individual missions to large-scale private infrastructure, the question “which state is responsible?” becomes more than a doctrinal issue. It becomes a practical question for mission planning, transactions, financing, insurance and compliance.
For companies active in the space sector, or planning to enter it, the first regulatory question is therefore not only what technology will be used or which market will be served. It is also under whose responsibility the activity will take place, which authorisations are required, and how continuing supervision will be ensured over the lifecycle of the mission.
If you are planning space activities, we are here to support you in identifying the applicable regulatory framework, obtaining the necessary authorisations and structuring your operations in a way that works in practice.
